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MISCONDUCT OF JURORS - IMPEACHMENT
OF VERDICT - NEW TRIAL
People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211,
282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
In People v. DeLucia,1 the New York Court of Appeals was
presented with the question of just how much the United States Supreme Court ruling in Parker v. Gladden2 had affected the longstanding rule that jurors would not be permitted to impeach their
own verdict. In Parker, the Court ruled that when a baliff, who
was assigned to shepherd a sequestered jury, made unauthorized
statements to some of the jurors, there was created an "outside influence" upon the jury.3 The Court stated that this outside influence could have affected the jury's verdict and, in fact, might have
become a witness against the defendant, all in contravention of the
defendant's rights under the sixth amendment to the Constitution.4
In DeLucia, two defendants were convicted of attempted burglary in the third degree and of possession of burglar tools. Shortly
after the verdict had been rendered, some of the jurors admitted to
defendants' counsel that several jurors had made an unauthorized
visit to the scene of the crime, had reinacted the crime, and had
thereafter related their experience to the remainder of the jury.5
Based on the above facts, the initial question focused on by the
DeLucia court was whether there could be any exception to the traditional rule that jurors would not be permitted to impeach their
own verdicts. The court determined that its decision depended on
whether the protection of an individual's constitutional rights outweighed the policy reasons for the strict rule against jurors' selfimpeachment.' The court decided, solely on the basis of the Parker
1 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967). This case came up
for reargument following the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363 (1966). Initially, the New York Court of Appeals had affirmed the conviction of
the defendants involved in this case. People v. DeLucia, 15 N.Y.2d 294, 206 N.E.2d
324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
2 385 U.S. 363 (1966).

The bailiff in Parkeron one occasion stated to an alternate juror and was overheard
by another juror: "Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty." Id. On another occasion he
said to another juror: "If there is anything wrong the Supreme Court will correct it."
Id. at 364. Little did he realize the accuracy of his prophecy.
4 Id. at 364. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial.. by an impartial jury ... and . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
520 N.Y.2d at 275, 229 N.E.2d at 211,282 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
6Id. at 278, 229 N.E.2d at 213, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
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decision, that a defendant's right to a -trial by a fair and impartial
jury was of greater importance,7 reasoning that although the rule
against jurors' impeachment of their verdicts is essential to the
smooth conduct of jury trials, the exception drawn in DeLucia
would in no way infringe upon the merits or the workability of the
general rule. The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing to test the truth of the appellants' allegations. Upon proof of
the allegations, an order for a new trial would follow.8
As a result of DeLucia, New York's rule against a juror's impeachment of his verdict applies only when the investigation into
jury misconduct is concerned with what happened in the jury room
and does not apply when the investigation concerns a fact in the
form of an "outside influence" which would violate rights granted
under the sixth amendment.' Because such outside influences occur
infrequently and are susceptible to adequate proof, the rule that a
juror will not be allowed to impeach his verdict remains essentially
intact.'0
The question, however, remains as to the future scope and definition of "outside influence." In DeLucia, the visit to the scene of
the crime by the jurors amounted to evidence against the defendants
which was presented out of the confines of the court - that is,
extraneous to the established guilt-determining procedure. The defendants lacked all the fundamental avenues of defending themselves from the ill-gained evidence. Thus the effect of such prejudicial evidence entering the sanctity of the court was dear in De71d. at 278, 229 N.B.2d at 213, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
8
In a letter from appellants' counsel, this writer learned that the testimony of the
jurors at the hearing established the allegations of the unauthorized view with the re-

suIt that a new trial has since been ordered. Letter from William Sonenshine to William J. Davis, Nov. 8, 1967.
9 The court did not discuss the question of State action in extending the protection
of the sixth amendment to the appellants. The reader, however, should be aware of the
problem of State action which potentially lingers in every appeal concerning the denial
of individual rights granted under the U.S. Constitution. In Parker,the bailiff was unquestionably an officer of the State, and the State action requirement was obviously
fulfilled. In DeLucia, it seems fairly certain that the jurors would fulfill the requirement
in that they were acting as agents, of a sor for the State, as an integral part of the State
judicial system. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083
(1960).
1
oSee State v. Kotiolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955), in which the court
similarly took exception to the rule. The court said:
Where, however, jurors' testimony goes, not to the motives or methods
or processes by which they reached the verdict, but merely to the existence of
conditions or the occurrence of events bearing on the verdict, that basis of
policy does not exist, and this whether the condition happens or the event occurs in or outside of the jury room. Id. at 100, 118 A.2d at 816.
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Lucia - the purity of the courtroom, in which the supposed goal
is the honest determination of guilt or innocense via the thrust and
parry by counsel on both sides with evidence presented in a formal
manner, was not afforded the defendants.
The difficulty with "outside influence" arises when the inequity
is not so clear cut. In Sheppard v. Maxwell," the question of jurors'
verdict impeachment was not at issue, but the atmosphere created
at the Sheppard murder trial by the Cleveland news media could
very well have been labeled an "outside influence" and conformed
to the definition of outside influence as enunciated in Parker and
interpreted in DeLucia. This leads to the question whether a juror
who ignores court admonishments and reads a newspaper article to
the defendant's prejudice should be allowed to impeach his previously rendered verdict. The only clue to future interpretation of
the rule is the majority's statement that the rule should not apply
where there is "a patent injustice to a defendant."'"
The decision marks a significant departure from the rule established at common law, a rule which took a strong hold in virtually
every American jurisdiction and with minor exceptions has remained intact.'" As the dissent vigorously points out, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions adhere to a strict interpretation
of the rule against the self-impeached verdict." Calling on antiquity and tradition under the guise of stare decisis, the dissent fired
salvos of precedent in an effort to save the time-honored rule from
what the dissent felt was wanton destruction. The rule was first
clearly defined by Lord Mansfield in Vaise v. Dela,el. 5 The justification afterwards offered by courts which followed the rule was
that if jurors' affidavits alleging their own misconduct were admitted, the doors to post-verdict jury-tampering would be constantly
opened.' 6 This argument is weakened, however, by other factors
"1384 U.S. 333 (1966).
12 20 N.Y.2d at 279,229 N.E.2d at 214,282 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
13 See 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 217 (1966); 25 U. CHI. L. REV.360 (1958).
14 20 N.Y.2d at 283, 229 N.E.2d at 216, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 533. For an exhaustive
survey of State cases, see 8 J.WIGMOm, EVIDENcE § 2354 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
15 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). The entire text of the opinion was:
The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high misdemeanor: but in every
such case the Court must derive their knowledge from some other source: such
as from some person having seen the transaction through a window, or by
some such other means. Id.
16See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Payne v. Burke, 236 App.
Div. 527, 260 N.Y.S. 259 (1932). For a general policy discussion, see 8 J.WIGMORE,
supra note 14, § 2353.
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that guard against jury-tampering. Ethical standards might prohibit
post-verdict tampering of the sort feared by the courts when they
invoke the rule.' Undoubtedly, the caution embodied in the rule
is wise if reasonably restrained.
The rule itself has not been negated by this case. Its application, however, has been restricted and a significant avenue heretofore blocked has now been opened. There is now additional
cause for inquiry into a jury's activities during the trial itself, albeit
the additional area of inquiry is small. Where before almost no
jury conduct was assailable after the verdict had been rendered,
counsel suspicious of a jury's folly or naivet6 can now seek out misconduct at least as to outside activities not connected with delibera8
tion.1
While this decision does not destroy the rule against jurors' impeachment, the question arises as to whether it opens any road for
further erosion. Perhaps the most formidable obstacle which impedes progress in trimming the harshness from unrestricted application of the rule is the American reverence for the jury system itself.
Trial 'by jury is asserted to be the law's bond with democracy, 9 the
safeguard of the equities," ° and the most meaningful heritage from
our English forefathers."' Correspondingly, the dissenting judge
in DeLucia called upon the democratic appeal of the jury system
when he argued: "One of the advantages asserted in favor of jury
trials is that jurors bring to bear upon the point at issue their varied
individual experiences of life. ' ' m While such arguments may be
flattering to the man in the street, they do little to console the defendant whose conviction erroneously stands because of the misapplication of the rule. The late Jerome Frank forthrightly thrust
the jury system into realistic focus by pointing out that although
judges and lawyers publicly acclaim trial by jury as an integral and
desireable part of the American way of life, they privately wince at
the thought of the jury as they view its function in the legal process.2" Most judges, Judge Frank asserted, regard jury deliberation
". A federal judge issued an injunction to restrain counsel from post-trial interrogation of jurors and rebuked the Ethics Committee of the Bar Association of New York
City for condoning such practices. United States v. Driscoll, 36 U.S.L.W. 2276
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1967), noted in N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1967, § M, at 43, col. 7.
IsBut see note 17 supra.
19 J. FRANK, CouRtTs ON TRIAL 135 (1949).
201d. at 136.
211d. at 110.
2220 N.Y.2d at 287,229 N.F.2d at 219,282 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
2
3J. FRANK, supra note 19, at 108-10.
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as a cauldron of dubious ingredients which, if slightly investigated,
would boil over, exposing all the inherent injustices and pulling
down in its course the comfortable veil of democratic involvement
which has taken so long to grow.24 Thus exclusionary rules, such
as the rule against a juror's impeaching his verdict, serve a double
function: they permit the court to keep a tight lid on the cauldron
of unmentionables on the one hand, and they preserve the standard
notions of fair play and democratic justice on the other. DeLuacia,
in its exception to the rule, may be a recognition of the underlying
"illegitimacy" of the jury function; and while the decision may
serve to undermine faith in the jury system, such dogmatic faith was
ill founded in the first place.25
The sentimental argument that the jury system is an essential
part of our heritage from England is refuted by the present lack of
civil jury trials in England and the abolishment of the unanimity
requirement for jury verdicts in criminal cases.2" An American observer of the British trial courts was forced to take a second look at
the present American jury system." A comparison of the two methods led to the suggestion of a program of permanent jurors, composed of longtime residents of mature years with records of honesty
and integrity in the community."8 Permanent jurors would become
versed in the rules of factfinding and resilient to the antics of dramatic trial lawyers, thus eliminating many of the causes of criticism.
While such a scheme, if workable, is not within the foreseeable future, the probing of the rule against verdict impeachment is at
least a recognition of the problem and a step in the right direction.
In light of the facts of DeLucia, which are narrow and which obviously affected the defendants adversely, the possibility of any im24 Id. at 115-16. Judge Frank sought to allow the true workings of the jury to be
aired in public in order that they could be analysed and profited from. Having recognized the "unmentionable" side of justice, we could then set about to shape the law of
trial procedure to utilize the layman-juror sense of justice instead of pretending that it
was not there. Constructively, Judge Frank advocated: 1) the abandonment of jury
trials except for the most grave criminal cases, 2) selection of jurors for their special
knowledge, 3) special verdicts only, 4) compulsory instruction of jurors in the do's and
don't's of factfinding, 5) the recording of jury room deliberations, and 6) the revision
of exclusionary rules such as the one presently under discussion. Id. at 141-45.
25 See Galston, Civil Jury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A.B.A.J. 195 (1943) (suggesting the recording of jury deliberations).
26
See 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 416, 438 (1966). But see Kalven and Zeisel, The
American Jury - Notes for an English Controversy, 48 CHI.B. RECORD 195 (1967)
(suggesting that the abolishment of the unanimity requirement will not substantially
change the frequency of hung juries).
27 Richards, A New Look At Our jury System, 41 FLA. B.J. 93 (1967).
28 Id.at 99.
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mediate significant collapse of the rule seems remote. The majority
opinion effectively performed minor surgery in an effort to rid the
rule of some of its senility, but just as effectively closed the wound to
insure a proper healing.
GILBERT M. MANCHESTER

